The Pachyderm Post

I am still waiting for print and broadcast commentators to broach another looming Iraqi Pachyderm Problem.

As the U.S. begins to send over twenty thousand additional troops into Baghdad and Anbar province, why are we not hearing more about the ability of the armed combatants there to “Rope-a-Dope.”

If you remember, famed boxer Muhammad Ali met man-mountain George Foreman in the 1974 heavyweight title fight that was then billed “The Rumble in The Jungle” in Kinshasa, Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo).

Foreman, an 8 to 1 favorite, was expected by most to demolish the smaller, older Ali, who had lost to Joe Frazier in 1971.

Ali won.

Why? Because he acknowledged the conventional superiority of Foreman (which was, at the time, Ali’s Pachyderm Problem) and turned it to his advantage.

How? By leaning back against the ropes and allowing, even encouraging, Foreman to punch away as hard as he could.

He called it the “rope-a-dope.”

Ali waited, Foreman eventually tired, and in the eighth round, Ali struck the final blows, with a left-right combination that sent Foreman sprawling.

It was over.

The U.S. Administration’s diverse “enemy combatants” in the Iraq Theater are completely aware of such tactics, and they have a fundamental advantage that Ali did not: time.

They also have objectives which are not symmetrically opposed to U.S. stated military goals, which are, simply put, to pacify Baghdad and Anbar Province long enough to justify a declaration of victory, and then to withdraw.

The fulfillment of this goal, however, in no way constitutes the defeat of the myriad insurgents, foreign fighters, Jihaadists, sectarian militias and others who are battling the U.S. and themselves for a range of strategic outcomes.

The first substantial signal of the potential “rope a dope” strategy was yesterday’s statement of government support by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the spiritual leader of Irag’s majority Shi’ites.

He apparently gave his blessing to government efforts to disarm militants, both Sunni and Shi’ite.

Well…why not? Wouldn’t you?

That is, if you were the majority and the least of your problems was re-arming after newly named Commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, General David Petraeus has returned to the U.S.

There is so much more to say about this issue. For the moment, though, I’ll leave you with another thought…

General Petraeus is a Princeton PhD in international relations and a seasoned combat commander. He recently co-authored the rewriting of the Army’s Manual on Counterinsurgency Operations.

He understands everything that I’ve just said about the “rope-a-dope.”

Is he actually counting on the unfolding of just this tactic?

Is he betting – like those who bet on Muhammad Ali in 1974 – that key Iraqi combatants will provisionally stand down until the U.S. can “calm and run.”

We’ll see.

VB